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This note proposes a graphical approach useful in game theory. This method consists in
representing incentives to move strategically to graphical areas. The method can be used on
several occasions; we apply it as an example to the model of Bouët (2001).
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We consider a Cournot duopoly. Two agents A and B compete in terms
of quantity. The commodities are homogeneous and the inverse demand
function, in a linear model, can be written as
p(a + b)=θ − k · (a + b)
θ > 0; k>0
The marginal cost of production (c) is supposed constant; thus the payoﬀ of
A is
π = a · [θ − k · (a + b)] − c · a (1)
implying a linear reaction function f whose slope is equal to (−2)
a = f(b)
Equation (2) can easily be obtained from the ﬁrst order condition of (1).
π(b a,b)=k · b a
2 (2)
For each point which pertains to reaction function of A,t h e r ei sal e v e lo f
proﬁt which depends only on the quantity produced by B (a is ﬁx e do ni t s
optimal level b a, for each quantity produced by the agent B).
If we choose two unspeciﬁed points (δ and ε) of the reaction function
R, the variation of the proﬁts obtained by A, between these two points1 is
written:









πδ − πε = k · (aδ − aε) · (aδ + aε) (3)
The slope of the reaction function is in this case (−2), and consequently
equation (3) becomes










· (aδ + aε)
1Subscript denotes the corresponding point.
1S = 1
2 · (bε − bδ) · (aδ + aε) is the surface of the trapezoide (bεεδbδ).T h i s
surface is shaded in ﬁgure 1.Then,
πδ − πε = k · S








Figure 1: Graphical method: general case
2 Application to the model of Bouët (2001)
The model of Bouët (2001) corresponds to the framework clariﬁed in the
previous section, but applied to a North-South Cournot duopoly. First only
the North can invest in a cost reducing R&D activity and then both com-
pete in quantity. The issue of the investment is uncertain; on the one hand,
prob(c = cb)=α(r): the probability (prob) that the North obtains the low
marginal cost (cb) in the last stage of the game is a function of the volume of
R&D investment r. On the other hand, [1 − α(r)] is the probability that the
high marginal cost of production (ch) is obtained. This probability is endoge-
nously determined since it depends positively on the volume of investment
2in R&D (r). Depending on the success or the failure of the investment, the
reaction function is respectively Rb or Rh. A not very binding VER (vol-
untary export restraint) modiﬁes only one of the equilibria: Nh is replaced
by Nz, as depicted in Figure 2. The method, suggested in the ﬁrst section
indicates that, in case of failure, the VER induces an increase of the proﬁt
of the North. This increase reduces the incentive to invest in R&D activity,
which is represented by S1 in ﬁgure 2 (k =1in this case). By increasing
only the proﬁt corresponding to an unfavourable issue of the investment (the
proﬁt in case of success remains the same), the VER slows down the incentive
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Figure 2: Application to proposition 2 (Bouët, 2001: 328)
Conversely, in the presence of a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ, the reaction function of
the South moves from R∗ to Rτ∗. Both free trade Nash equilibria are now
modiﬁed. The ﬁrst one implies a decrease of the incentive to innovate (S2),
whereas the second one induces an increase of the incentive to innovate (S3).
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Figure 3: Application to proposition 3 (Bouët, 2001: 332 )
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